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Governments and Their Partners” 
 
John C. Dehn* 
In law and policy discussions of the targeted killing of suspected terrorists, the focus 
is typically on the international legal rights and obligations of a state engaging in 
targeted killing, the “attacking state.” Little to no attention has been paid to the 
international obligations of the state in which a violent non-state actor is located and 
targeted, referred to as the “territorial state.”1 Such myopia reduces the territorial 
                                                 
 
* Senior Fellow, West Point Center for the Rule of Law and judge advocate, U.S. Army. The 
views presented are the author’s personal views and not necessarily those of the Department 
of the Army, the United States Military Academy, the West Point Center for the Rule of Law 
or any other agency of the U.S. government. 
1 NOAM LUBELL, EXTRATERRITORIAL USE OF FORCE AGAINST NON-STATE ACTORS 36 
(2010). 
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state’s legal considerations to the infringement of sovereignty occasioned by an 
attacking state’s actions within its territory. 
This brief commentary considers the potential effect of a territorial state’s 
international human rights obligations on the law governing targeted killings. It posits 
that these obligations should limit permissible attacks by an attacking state when the 
territorial state is not party to an armed conflict with the relevant non-state actor, 
particularly when a territorial state consents to the attacking state’s actions. It also 
argues that a territorial state’s extraterritorial human rights obligations provides 
support for an attacking state’s right to resort to force in the territorial state when it 
fails to suppress a resident threat. It concludes by briefly suggesting that recognizing 
the necessity of effective governance to the preservation of human rights could 
prompt the development of an international law of ungoverned spaces, perhaps best 
thought of as “international martial law.” 
I. THE TARGETED KILLING DEBATE 
In this discussion, “targeted killing” refers to the premeditated, extraterritorial use of 
lethal force by a state against a non-state actor with which it is engaged in armed 
conflict or that presents a present and ongoing threat of harm while located within 
the ineffectively- or substantially un-governed territory of another state. This 
definition is a much narrower subset of targeted killing analyzed in other 
commentaries, which includes all lethal action by states against individuals not in their 
custody.2 It does, however, encompass widely reported but vaguely acknowledged 
U.S. operations targeting members of al-Qaeda and associated groups outside of 
Afghanistan.3  
                                                 
 
2 See, e.g., NILS MELZER, TARGETED KILLING IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 3–5 (2009) (defining 
targeted killing as the intentional use of lethal force against specific individuals not in the 
custody of the entity to which the act is attributable under international law); Special 
Rapporteur on Extrajudicial, Summary or Arbitrary Executions, Study on Targeted Killings, p. 3, 
U.N. Human Rights Council, U.N. Doc. A/HRC/14/24/Add.6 (May 26, 2010) (by Philip 
Alston) (“A targeted killing is the intentional, premeditated and deliberate use of lethal force, 
by States or their agents acting under colour of law, or by an organized armed group in armed 
conflict, against a specific individual who is not in the physical custody of the perpetrator.”). 
These definitions are far too broad for this discussion.  
3 See, e.g., Joe Becker & Scott Shane, Secret ‘Kill List’ Proves a Test of Obama’s Principles and Will, 
N.Y. TIMES, May 29, 2012, http://www.nytimes.com/2012/05/29/world/obamas-leadership-
in-war-on-al-qaeda.html (citing unnamed officials describing how the President selects targets 
for drone attacks); David Nakamura, Obama on ‘Tonight Show’ with Jay Leno: Full Video and 
Transcript, WASH. POST, Oct. 26, 2011, http://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/ 
44/post/obama-on-tonight-show-with-jay-leno-full-video-and-transcript/2011/10/26/ 
gIQAHXJjIM_blog.html (during interview the President discusses drone program and its 
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The basic lines of the legal debate surrounding this subset of targeted killing have 
been drawn. There are several contested issues, but three are most prominent.4 The 
first and most fundamental is whether or under what circumstances a state has and 
may exercise its inherent right of self-defense against an extraterritorial non-state 
actor that has harmed and/or poses an imminent or ongoing threat of harm to its 
citizens. Next is whether or under what circumstances any such right of self-defense 
permits a state to intrude into another state’s territory to exercise it. The final 
significant issue is whether the “attack,” the act effecting a targeted killing, is regulated 
by international human rights law or by international humanitarian law,5 the latter of 
which many insist should be applied in complementary fashion with international 
human rights law.6  
II. THE RELEVANCE OF TERRITORIAL STATE HUMAN RIGHTS 
OBLIGATIONS 
Of what import are a territorial state’s international human rights obligations to these 
three issues? The International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR) 
requires a state party “to respect and to ensure to all individuals within its territory 
                                                                                                                            
 
effectiveness); Peter Finn & Joby Warrick, CIA Director Says Secret Attacks in Pakistan Have 
Hobbled al-Qaeda, WASH. POST, Mar. 18, 2010, http://www.washingtonpost.com/ 
wp-dyn/content/article/2010/03/17/AR2010031702558.html.  
4 For a more detailed explication of the myriad international legal issues involved, see 
LUBELL, supra note 1, at 36. 
5 International humanitarian law regulates the conduct of parties to an armed conflict, 
whether state or non-state. It prescribes (and in some circumstances, removes) protections for 
individuals and property based upon their status in relation to the conflict and regulates the 
permissible means and methods of warfare. International human rights law regulates the 
relationship between states and individuals more generally and delineates permissible 
derogation(s) from accepted base principles under certain circumstances.  
6 Some argue that international human rights law, including any permissible derogation, 
applies during armed conflict unless displaced by a relevant rule of international humanitarian 
law. See, e.g., Gabor Rona, A Response to Ohlin About IHL and IHRL, OPINIO JURIS (Jan. 17, 
2012, 5:10 AM), http://opiniojuris.org/2012/01/17/a-response-to-ohlin-about-ihl-and-ihrl/. 
Others argue that international humanitarian law is lex specialis between the parties to an armed 
conflict and applies anywhere acts of hostilities (broadly defined) are undertaken. See, e.g., Jens 
David Ohlin, IHL and IHRL, LIEBER CODE (Jan. 14, 2012, 2:58 PM), 
http://www.liebercode.org/2012/01/ihl-and-ihrl.html. I confess that my views on this topic 
are nuanced. For a more nuanced view of this complementary relationship in non-
international armed conflict, see Marco Sassóli & Laura M. Olson, The Relationship of 
International Humanitarian and Human Rights Law Where It Matters: Admissible Killing and Internment 
of Fighters in Non-International Armed Conflicts, 90 INT’L REV. RED CROSS 599, 616-27 (2008). 
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and subject to its jurisdiction their international human rights.”7 These obligations 
would seem relevant to any armed attack within a state’s territory, where it clearly 
must both respect and ensure the human rights of its population.  
It has been argued that human rights law alone governs an attacking state’s use of 
defensive or preventive force beyond active battlefields and that any killing in such 
circumstances is therefore strictly limited to that which is necessary to counter an 
immediate threat or actual attack.8 But there are indications that the governments of 
both Pakistan and Yemen may (secretly) consent to targeted killing within their 
borders.9 May a territorial state consent to a targeted killing consistently with its 
obligation to ensure the human rights of its population? Some might readily say, 
“certainly not,” but the situation is more complex than it seems.  
At first glance, it would seem that a state’s “responsibility to protect” its population10 
would prohibit a territorial state from allowing another state to attack individuals 
within its territory. After all, a state’s responsibility to protect its population should 
apply equally to harm emanating from within or without its borders. A territorial state 
may therefore violate its human rights obligations by consenting to an attacking state’s 
targeted killing operation. 
                                                 
 
7 International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights art. 2, opened for signature Dec. 16, 1966, 
S. Exec. Doc. E, 95-2 (1978), 999 U.N.T.S. 171 (entered into force Mar. 23, 1976); id. at S. 
Treaty Doc. 95-20, 6 I.L.M. 368 (1967). 
8 See Mary Ellen O’Connell, Unlawful Killing with Combat Drones, in SHOOTING TO KILL: THE 
LAW GOVERNING LETHAL FORCE IN CONTEXT (Simon Bronitt ed., forthcoming), available at 
http://ssrn.com/abstract=1501144. 
9 Regarding Pakistan, see Adam Entous, Siobhan Gorman & Evan Perez, U.S. Unease over 
Drone Strikes, WALL ST. J., Sept. 26, 2012, at 1 (citing unnamed officials describing the U.S. 
method of obtaining what it deems Pakistan’s tacit approval of drone strikes). Regarding 
Yemen, see Greg Miller, Yemen Leader Says He Approves All Drone Strikes, WASH. POST, Sept. 30, 
2012, at 3 (quoting Yemen's President, Abed Rabbo Monsour Hadi, “[e]very operation, before 
taking place, they take permission from the president”). 
10 INT’L COMM. ON INTERVENTION AND STATE SOVEREIGNTY, THE RESPONSIBILITY TO 
PROTECT 13 (2001) [hereinafter ICISS REPORT] (“Thinking of sovereignty as responsibility, in 
a way that is being increasingly recognized in state practice, has a threefold significance. First, 
it implies that the state authorities are responsible for the functions of protecting the safety 
and lives of citizens and promotion of their welfare. Secondly, it suggests that the national 
political authorities are responsible to the citizens internally and to the international 
community through the UN. And thirdly, it means that the agents of state are responsible for 
their actions; that is to say, they are accountable for their acts of commission and omission.”). 
The United Nations General Assembly eventually legitimized the central conclusions of this 
report. See G.A. Res. 60/1, ¶¶ 120-122, U.N. Doc. A/RES/60/1 (Oct. 24, 2005). For a 
concise discussion, see Daniel Rice & John Dehn, Armed Humanitarian Intervention: A Primer for 
Military Professionals, 87 Mil. Rev. 38, 42-43 (2007).  
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However, the specific circumstances clearly matter. A state is justified in consenting to 
such attacks if it is also engaged in an internal armed conflict with the relevant non-
state actor.11 But may it also do so if, due to other internal conflict or general 
weakness in the de jure government, it is unable to arrest or otherwise suppress 
activities within its borders that inflict or seek to inflict harm outside its borders? 
Either of these scenarios may accurately describe the situations, in whole or in part, in 
Pakistan and Yemen. Pushing the assumption one step further, if a territorial state is 
not engaged in an armed conflict with the target of another state’s attack, may it 
consent to a use of force that conforms to international humanitarian law but not 
human rights standards? If not, what should be the consequences of its doing so, for 
either the attacking or territorial state? Particularly in cases of consent, where a 
territorial state has ceded a part of its sovereignty to an attacking state, an attacking 
state’s targeted killing operations should be limited to some uncertain extent by the 
territorial state’s internal human rights obligations. Precisely how has been under-
analyzed. Lack of clarity in this area may be one reason, among others, why Pakistan 
(reportedly) does not expressly consent to U.S. drone attacks within its borders.12 
A territorial state’s human rights obligations should also be relevant to an attacking 
state’s right to resort to armed force against a violent non-state actor within its 
territory. It is often argued that states have extraterritorial, one might say, external, 
human rights obligations. Applying a disjunctive reading to the ICCPR provision 
quoted above, many argue that states must respect the human rights of all persons, 
wherever located, and must also ensure (or secure) the human rights of those within 
its territory or jurisdiction.13 Some adopt elastic definitions of “jurisdiction” 
(encompassing virtually all governmental acts) to extend human rights obligations 
extraterritorially.14  
If we ascribe to a territorial state the same extraterritorial human rights obligations 
that many would apply to an attacking state, then a territorial state should be 
responsible for suppressing any threat within its territory that would deprive those 
outside its territory of their human rights. This is not an issue of attributing the 
conduct of a resident non-state actor to its territorial state, but rather of recognizing 
the responsibility of a territorial state to prevent extraterritorial harm in order to 
respect the human rights of those outside its borders. 
                                                 
 
11 States may generally seek the aid of other states in dealing with internal threats without 
affecting the nature of the armed conflict or the permissible forms of attack. See, e.g., Sylvain 
Vite, Typology of Armed Conflicts in International Humanitarian Law: Legal Concepts and Actual 
Situations, 91 INT’L REV. OF THE RED CROSS 69, 80 (2009). 
12 See Entous, et al., supra note 9. 
13 See LUBELL, supra note 1, at 195-207 (surveying a range of opinions on the topic). 
14 See id. at 207-13 (surveying several of these claims). 
2012 / Targeted Killing, Human Rights and Ungoverned Spaces 89 
 
 
 
Recognizing that states must prevent injuries to other states and their nationals 
comports with generally accepted first principles of international law. An important 
and fundamental principle of international law is formal sovereign equality.15 All states 
may pursue their interests as long as they do not infringe upon, or allow the 
infringement of, the rights of other states and their nationals.16 Any such infringement 
was traditionally understood to create a remedial right in the injured state, including a 
right of reprisal or war.17 Commentators have posited that this fundamental aspect of 
the international legal system is why the First Congress enacted the Alien Tort Statute 
(ATS)—to provide an individual remedy for injured aliens and thereby obviate the 
need for a state-to-state remedy.18 It is also why the neutrality acts of the United 
States have long made it a crime for any person who “within the United States, 
knowingly begins,” aids, funds, or “takes part in, any military or naval expedition or 
enterprise . . . against the territory or dominion of any foreign prince or state, or of 
any colony, district, or people with whom the United States is at peace.”19 Both the 
ATS and the neutrality acts implement what should be properly understood as a 
state’s international obligation to prevent infringements of the individual (or 
collective) rights of foreign nationals by its citizens or by the elicit use of its territory. 
Viewing the targeted killing debate through the lens of a territorial state’s 
extraterritorial human rights obligations therefore strengthens the claims of some 
commentators that international law permits an attacking state to resort to armed 
force against a violent non-state actor within the territory of another state when that 
state is unwilling or unable to suppress the threat.20 If a state is unable or unwilling to 
                                                 
 
15 See, e.g., R.P. ANAND, SOVEREIGN EQUALITY OF STATES IN INTERNATIONAL LAW (2008). 
16 INTERNATIONAL GROUP OF EXPERTS, THE TALLINN MANUAL ON INTERNATIONAL LAW 
APPLICABLE TO CYBER WARFARE 33 (Michael N. Schmitt, ed., forthcoming 2013), available at 
http://www.ccdcoe.org/249.html (citing Corfu Channel (U.K. v. Alb.), 1949 I.C.J. 4, 22 (Apr. 
9) and, at n. 53, the Trail Smelter Case (U.S. v. Can.), 3 R.I.A.A. 1905, 1963 (1941)). 
17 See The Three Friends, 166 U.S. 1, 52 (1897). 
18 See, e.g., Anthony J. Bellia & Bradford R. Clark, The Alien Tort Statute and the Law of Nations, 
78 U. CHI. L. REV. 445, 471–77 (2011); Thomas H. Lee, The Safe-Conduct Theory of the Alien Tort 
Statute, 106 COLUM. L. REV. 830, 873 (2006). 
19 Neutrality Act of 1794, ch. 50, § 5, 1 Stat. 381, 384 (codified as amended at 18 U.S.C. § 
960 (1994)). 
20 For arguments supporting an “unable or unwilling” standard for the extraterritorial 
exercise of self-defense, see Ashley S. Deeks, “Unwilling or Unable”: Toward a Normative 
Framework for Extraterritorial Self-Defense, 52 VA. J. INT'L L. 483 (2012) (reviewing state practice 
arguably supporting the existence of an “unable or unwilling” standard and suggesting 
doctrinal improvements). See also Brian Finucane, Fictitious States, Effective Control, and the Use of 
Force Against Non-State Actors, 30 BERKELEY J. INT'L L. 35 (2012) (reviewing state practice 
arguably supporting the right to engage threats in ungoverned territory); Michael D. Banks, 
Addressing State (Ir-)Responsibility: The Use of Military Force as Self-Defense in International Counter-
Terrorism Operations, 200 MIL. L. REV. 54, 57 (2009)(“If a terrorist organization operates within 
a host State, and that host State cannot or will not act to prevent the terrorist organization 
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meet its obligations to prevent harm to those outside its territory, then—for reasons 
similar to those that justify humanitarian intervention—injured states, regional 
organizations or the international community should not be required to sit idly by.21 A 
territorial state’s external human rights obligations therefore support not only an 
attacking state’s inherent right (or if we consider the attacking state’s responsibility to 
protect its population, its obligation) to engage in self-defense against violent non-
state actors, but also its ability to exercise that right when a territorial state fails in its 
sovereign obligations to prevent extraterritorial harm. 
III. CONCLUSION: TOWARD A NEW PARADIGM? 
The international human rights obligations of a territorial state should be understood 
to place constraints the use of force by an attacking state, particularly when the 
territorial state consents to the attacks but is not party to an armed conflict with the 
relevant non-state actor. Those obligations also support an attacking state’s right to 
resort to armed force within a territorial state when the latter state is unwilling or 
unable to suppress a threat. These are the logical outgrowths of a territorial state’s 
internal and external human rights obligations. What is less clear, given the lack of 
attention to these matters thus far, is precisely how they should influence our 
understanding of the law regulating targeted killing. To suggest that an attacking state 
must observe the full measure of human rights law when targeting a non-state actor 
with which it is engaged in armed conflict seems overly simplistic. To permit targeting 
pursuant to the permissive standards of international humanitarian law beyond active 
battlefields might allow too much.   
Given these concerns, the law of targeted killing in ungoverned spaces may evolve. 
This analysis underscores the absolute necessity of effective governance to the 
preservation of international human rights. Governments must possess both de jure 
and de facto sovereignty in order to fulfill their territorial and extraterritorial human 
rights obligations. When governance fails, it threatens the human rights of not only 
those within such a state, but also potentially those in other states.  
Recognizing the necessity of effective governance to the preservation of human rights 
could shift the targeted killing debate away from an international 
                                                                                                                            
 
from attacking another State, the injured State may act in self-defense against the terrorist 
organization, with or without the consent of the host State.”). 
21 A similar moral and legal right to infringe upon the sovereignty of a state is made when it 
fails in its obligation to protect its population from harm. See, e.g., ICISS Report at 16 (“The 
emerging principle in question is that intervention for human protection purposes, including 
military intervention in extreme cases, is supportable when major harm to civilians is occurring 
or imminently apprehended, and the state in question is unable or unwilling to end the harm, 
or is itself the perpetrator.”). See also Rice & Dehn, supra note 10, at 39-40 (surveying moral 
and legal arguments in favor of armed humanitarian intervention). 
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humanitarian/human rights law dichotomy and towards the development of an 
international law of ungoverned spaces. This might best be conceived of as an 
“international martial law”—a body of law more permissive than the rules that govern 
law enforcement but without the full targeting authorities of international 
humanitarian law. A martial law paradigm might be a fair characterization of some 
existing scholarship on the topic of transnational terrorism,22 and of Israel’s well-
known targeted killing decision.23 Such a legal regime might prove more workable 
than insisting on respect for the full measure of international human rights law in 
circumstances when such rights cannot possibly be secured or preserved. In such 
cases, international law should allow the efficient but cautious elimination of obstacles 
to the preservation of human rights in order to help establish conditions in which 
those rights might ultimately flourish.  
                                                 
 
22 See, e.g., Claus Kreß, Some Reflections on the International Legal Framework Governing 
Transnational Armed Conflicts, 15 J. OF CONFLICT AND SEC. L. 245 (2010); David Kretzmer, 
Targeted Killing of Suspected Terrorists: Extra-Judicial Executions or Legitimate Means of Defence? 16 Eur. 
J. Int’l L. 171 (2005). 
23 HCJ 769/02 Pub. Comm. Against Torture in Isr. v. Gov’t of Isr. [Dec. 11, 2006] slip op. 
